Introduction
Bit Index Explicit Replication (BIER) [RFC8279] defines an architecture where all intended multicast receivers are encoded as bitmask in the Multicast packet header within different encapsulations such as [RFC8296] . A router that receives such a packet will forward the packet based on the Bit Position in the packet header towards the receiver(s), following a precomputed tree for each of the bits in the packet. Each receiver is represented by a unique bit in the bitmask. This document presents necessary extensions to the currently deployed ISIS for IP [RFC1195] protocol to support distribution of information necessary for operation of BIER domains and sub-domains. This document defines a new TLV to be advertised by every router participating in BIER signaling.
This document defines support for MPLS encapsulation as specified in [RFC8296] . Support for other encapsulation types is outside the scope of this document. The use of multiple encapsulation types is outside the scope of this document.
Terminology
Some of the terminology specified in [RFC8279] is replicated here and extended by necessary definitions:
BIER: Bit Index Explicit Replication (The overall architecture of forwarding multicast using a Bit Position). This document also introduces a new registry for sub-sub-TLVs for the BIER Info sub-TLV added above. The registration policy is Expert Review as defined in [RFC8126] . This registry is part of the "IS-IS TLV Codepoints" registry. The name of the registry is "sub-sub-TLVs for BIER Info sub-TLV". The defined values are: Within such a domain, the extensions defined in this document advertise BIER information for one or more BIER sub-domains. Each sub-domain is uniquely identified by a subdomain-id (SD). Each subdomain is associated with a single ISIS topology (MT) [RFC5120] , which may be any of the topologies supported by ISIS. Local configuration controls which <MT,SD> pairs are supported by a router. The mapping of sub-domains to topologies MUST be consistent within the IS-IS flooding domain used to advertise BIER information.
Each BIER sub-domain has as its unique attributes the encapsulation used and the type of tree it is using to forward BIER frames (currently always SPF). Additionally, per supported bitstring length in the sub-domain, each router will advertise the necessary label ranges to support it.
Advertising BIER Information
BIER information advertisements are associated with a new sub-TLV in the extended reachability TLVs. BIER information is always associated with a host prefix which MUST be a node address for the advertising node. If this is not the case the advertisement MUST be ignored. Therefore the following restrictions apply:
o Prefix length MUST be 32 for an IPv4 prefix or 128 for an IPv6 prefix o When the Prefix Attributes Flags sub-TLV is present N flag MUST be set and R flag MUST NOT be set. [RFC7794] o BIER sub-TLVs MUST be included when a prefix reachability advertisement is leaked between levels.
5. Procedures
Multi Topology and Sub-Domain
A given sub-domain is supported within one and only one topology. All routers in the flooding scope of the BIER sub-TLVs MUST advertise the same sub-domain within the same multi-topology. A router receiving an <MT,SD> advertisement which does not match the locally configured pair MUST report a misconfiguration of the received <MT,SD> pair. All received BIER advertisements associated with the conflicting <MT,SD> pair MUST be ignored. Note that in the presence of such a misconfiguration this will lead to partitioning of the subdomian.
Example:
The following combination of advertisements are valid: <0,0> <0,1> <2,2>.
The following combination of advertisements are invalid: <0,0> <0,1> <2,0>. Advertisements associated with <0,0> and <2,0> must be ignored.
BFR-id Advertisements
If a BFER/BFIR is configured with a BFR-id then it advertises this value in its BIER advertisements. If no BFR-id is configured then the value "Invalid BFR-id" is advertised. A valid BFR-id MUST be unique within the flooding scope of the BIER advertisements. All BFERs/BFIRs MUST detect advertisement of duplicate valid BFR-IDs for a given <MT, SD>. When such duplication is detected all of the routers advertising duplicates MUST be treated as if they did not advertise a valid BFR-id. This implies they cannot act as BFER or BFIR in that <MT,SD>.
Logging Misconfiguration
Whenever an advertisement is received which violates any of the constraints defined in this document the receiving router MUST support logging this occurrence. Logging SHOULD be dampened to avoid excessive output.
Flooding Reduction
It is expected that changes in BIER domain information which is advertised by IS-IS occur infrequently. If this expectation is not met for an extended period of time (more than a few seconds of burstiness) changes will increase the number of Link State PDU (LSP) updates and negatively impact performance in the network. Implementations SHOULD protect against this possibility e.g., by dampening updates if they occur over an extended period of time.
Packet Formats
All ISIS BIER information is carried within the TLVs 235, 237 [RFC5120] This sub-TLV carries the information for the BIER sub-domains that the router participates in as BFR. This sub-TLV MAY appear multiple times in a given prefix-reachability TLV -once for each sub-domain supported in the associated topology.
The sub-TLV advertises a single <MT,SD> combination followed by optional sub-sub-TLVs as described in the following sections. Label: First label of the range, 20 bits. The labels are as defined in [RFC8296] .
Security Considerations
Security concerns for IS-IS are addressed in [RFC5304] and [RFC5310] .
The Security Considerations section of [RFC8279] discusses the possibility of performing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by setting too many bits in the BitString of a BIER-encapsulated packet. However, this sort of DoS attack cannot be initiated by modifying the ISIS BIER advertisements specified in this document. A BFIR decides which systems are to receive a BIER-encapsulated packet. In making this decision, it is not influenced by the ISIS control messages. When creating the encapsulation, the BFIR sets one bit in the encapsulation for each destination system. The information in the ISIS BIER advertisements is used to construct the forwarding tables that map each bit in the encapsulation into a set of next hops for the host that is identified by that bit, but is not used by the BFIR to decide which bits to set. Hence an attack on the ISIS control plane cannot be used to cause this sort of DoS attack.
While a BIER-encapsulated packet is traversing the network, a BFR that receives a BIER-encapsulated packet with n bits set in its BitString may have to replicate the packet and forward multiple copies. However, a given bit will only be set in one copy of the packet. That means that each transmitted replica of a received packet has fewer bits set (i.e., is targeted to fewer destinations) than the received packet. This is an essential property of the BIER forwarding process as defined in [RFC8279] . While a failure of this process might cause a DoS attack (as discussed in the Security Considerations of [RFC8279] ), such a failure cannot be caused by an attack on the ISIS control plane.
Further discussion of BIER specific security considerations can be found in [RFC8279] .
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